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Abstract: We consider the coordination problem between a vendor and a buyer operating under generalized replenishment costs
that include fixed costs as well as stepwise freight costs. We study the stochastic demand, single-period setting where the buyer
must decide on the order quantity to satisfy random demand for a single item with a short product life cycle. The full order for the
cycle is placed before the cycle begins and no additional orders are accepted by the vendor. Due to the nonrecurring nature of the
problem, the vendor’s replenishment quantity is determined by the buyer’s order quantity. Consequently, by using an appropriate
pricing schedule to influence the buyer’s ordering behavior, there is an opportunity for the vendor to achieve substantial savings
from transportation expenses, which are represented in the generalized replenishment cost function.
For the problem of interest, we prove that the vendor’s expected profit is not increasing in buyer’s order quantity. Therefore,
unlike the earlier work in the area, it is not necessarily profitable for the vendor to encourage larger order quantities. Using this
nontraditional result, we demonstrate that the concept of economies of scale may or may not work by identifying the cases where
the vendor can increase his/her profits either by increasing or decreasing the buyer’s order quantity. We prove useful properties of
the expected profit functions in the centralized and decentralized models of the problem, and we utilize these properties to develop
alternative incentive schemes for win–win solutions. Our analysis allows us to quantify the value of coordination and, hence, to
identify additional opportunities for the vendor to improve his/her profits by potentially turning a nonprofitable transaction into a
profitable one through the use of an appropriate tariff schedule or a vendor-managed delivery contract. We demonstrate that financial
gain associated with these opportunities is truly tangible under a vendor-managed delivery arrangement that potentially improves
the centralized solution.
Although we take the viewpoint of supply chain coordination and our goal is to provide insights about the effect of transportation
considerations on the channel coordination objective and contractual agreements, the paper also contributes to the literature by
analyzing and developing efficient approaches for solving the centralized problem with stepwise freight costs in the single-period
setting. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 53: 397–417, 2006
Keywords: channel coordination; contracts; vendor-managed delivery; vendor-managed inventory; integrated inventory/trans-
portation decisions
1. INTRODUCTION
The fact that substantial savings can be realized due to
coordination of the parties in the supply chain was recognized
early in the 1970s [14,29], and since then buyer–vendor coor-
dination has been a popular research area. Within the large
spectrum of existing work in this area, centralized and decen-
tralized models can be considered the two extremes. The
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traditional approach to coordination suggests integrating and
modeling the replenishment decisions of the vendor and the
buyer together. This approach qualifies as centralized mod-
eling, and, undoubtedly, it provides the best result in terms
of total system cost, i.e., the global optimum. In applica-
tion, however, centralized control of the individual decisions
of the buyer and the vendor may not be desirable, or feasi-
ble, even if both parties represent components of the same
company. Furthermore, in real life, there is often a supe-
rior/subordinate relationship inherent in the situation where
the dominant party prefers his/her priorities to lead the solu-
tion. As a result, decentralized modeling of the problem may
be necessary. In a decentralized model, the parties solve
© 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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their subproblems independently of each other with limited
sharing of information.
While classical buyer–vendor coordination models can
generally be characterized as falling into one of the above-
mentioned two modeling approaches, i.e., centralized vs.
decentralized, the current trend is toward investigating ways
to implement decentralized models without sacrificing too
many of the cost saving benefits that result from central-
ized models. In keeping with this trend, the fundamental
idea behind channel coordination is to identify the inefficien-
cies in decentralized solutions for the purpose of aligning
the individual incentives for both parties with those of the
centralized solutions. This requires the decentralized solu-
tion to be improved in a way that (i) it results in the
same values for the decision variables as the centralized
solution and (ii) it suggests a mutually agreeable way of
sharing the resulting profits. The sharing can be done by
means of quantity discounts, rebates, refunds, fixed pay-
ments between the parties, free delivery as in the case of
a vendor-managed delivery (VMD) arrangement, or some
combination of these. All of these methods for achieving
centralized profits using a decentralized approach represent
different forms of incentive schemes or so-called coordina-
tion mechanisms whose terms can be negotiable between
the parties or are implicitly enforced by one party to influ-
ence the behavior of the other. As a result, the output of
channel coordination, i.e., the so-called coordinated solution,
combines the benefits of both centralized and decentralized
solutions.
Despite the growing body of research on channel coordina-
tion, the existing literature overlooks important transportation
considerations. In particular, the impact of truck/cargo capac-
ity constraints and generalized inbound/outbound transporta-
tion cost functions are not taken into account. However,
substantial system-wide efficiencies may be achievable by
carefully incorporating such transportation considerations
with the channel coordination objective. Recognizing a need
for research on this topic, this paper is aimed at developing
efficient coordination mechanisms for buyer–vendor prob-
lems with explicit transportation considerations represented
via generalized replenishment costs. More specifically, the
current paper extends the earlier work in channel coordina-
tion in order to consider: (i) truck capacity constraints for
both inbound and outbound transport equipment and (ii) a
general transportation cost structure that can explicitly rep-
resent the expenses associated with a fleet of vehicles, rather
than a single truck. The paper seeks answers to the follow-
ing key questions about channel coordination and contractual
agreements under explicit transportation considerations.
Q1. What are the effects of transportation capacities and
costs on the channel coordination objective, and how
do we quantify these effects?
Q2. Can the classical coordination mechanisms, i.e., tra-
ditional pricing and incentive schemes, be used to
achieve the channel coordination objective when
the buyer–vendor system is subject to generalized
transportation costs?
Q3. What are the benefits of alternative delivery agree-
ments, such as a VMD contract, for the vendor and
the buyer?
Q4. What insights can a third party transportation
provider derive given the information that the buyer–
vendor channel is coordinated?
For the purpose of providing realistic answers to the
above questions, a practically common cost structure, which
includes a fixed replenishment/delivery cost as well as a step-
wise truck cost, is modeled for both the vendor and the buyer.
This cost structure can be represented by the functional form






where Q denotes the replenishment quantity; K denotes the
fixed replenishment cost; P denotes the truck capacity; and
R denotes the truck cost. As a result, the replenishment costs
include both a fixed portion and a freight cost that is pro-
portional to the number of trucks used. The functional form
given in Expression (1) is also known in the literature as the
multiple setup cost function, and it has several applications in
batch industries where the manufacturer incurs a setup cost
of R for every batch of size Q along with a production setup
cost of K . Hence, the models in this paper are also applicable
in a setting where the system replenishes via batch produc-
tion. For several practical applications of the multiple setup
cost function, see [1, 21, 24, 35].
More specifically, considering a single-period, stochastic
demand setting, we study two models. Model I is a special
case where the generalized replenishment cost structure given
by Expression (1) is incorporated into the vendor’s costs only.
Model II is a generalization of Model I, and it considers the
generalized replenishment cost structure in Expression (1)
for both the vendor and the buyer by making a distinction
between the vendor’s and buyer’s fixed replenishment costs,
i.e., Kv and Kb; the vendor’s and buyer’s truck capacities, i.e.,
Pv and Pb; and the buyer’s and vendor’s per truck costs, i.e.,
Rv and Rb. However, it is important to note here that the
insights gained in this paper are essentially based on the prop-
erties of the vendor’s profit function which, in turn, depends
on the vendor’s costs. That is, in both models, the vendor’s
profit is not an increasing function of the buyer’s order quan-
tity because the generalized replenishment cost structure in
Expression (1) is modeled for the vendor. Consequently, tra-
ditional coordination mechanisms, such as quantity discounts
that exhibit economies of scale, are not always applicable for
the problem under investigation.
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The coordinated solution in fact depends on both the
centralized and the decentralized solutions: the former sets
a benchmark for cost or profit whereas the latter helps
to identify opportunities for coordination. Hence, for the
problem of interest in this paper, we also analyze and
compare the corresponding decentralized and centralized
solutions. Although the focus of this paper is on coordina-
tion issues, the paper also contributes to the literature by
analyzing and developing efficient solution approaches for
solving the underlying centralized problem with stepwise
costs in the single-period setting. Studying the analytical
properties of the expected profit functions for the vendor
and the buyer in the centralized and decentralized models
of the problem, we find that quantity discounts that exhibit
economies of scale are no longer sufficient under generalized
replenishment costs. Hence, we develop alternative incen-
tive schemes that are applicable when inefficiencies occur
due to diseconomies of scale under explicit transportation
considerations.
Based on our results, we identify opportunities for the
vendor to improve his/her profits by potentially turning a non-
profitable transaction into a profitable one through the use of
an appropriate tariff schedule or a VMD arrangement under
which the vendor covers the buyer’s transportation expenses.
We argue that such a VMD arrangement may potentially
improve on the centralized solution, and, hence, deliver a
truly win–win alternative for the coordinated solution. We
also quantify the financial gain associated with the proposed
VMD arrangement and show that it is truly tangible for some
problem instances. Finally, we provide insights for a third
party transportation provider by showing that either the trans-
portation considerations do not have an effect on the channel
coordination objective (i.e., coordinated solutions with, and
without, the generalized replenishment cost considerations
are the same), or if they do have an affect, coordination is
achieved at the full truck load level.
Next we revisit some basic ideas from the existing chan-
nel coordination literature, which provide a foundation for
our analysis. This is followed in Section 3 by a summary
of the literature where we also elaborate on the contribu-
tions of our study in relation to previous work. Notation and
problem formulations are presented in Section 4. We discuss
our mathematical results in Section 5 where we provide cen-
tralized and decentralized analyses of Models I and II and
develop new pricing/incentive schemes allowing the ven-
dor to influence the order quantity of the buyer. Section 6
presents a summary of some important managerial insights
and concludes the paper.
2. CHANNEL COORDINATION BASICS
“Channel coordination” is a phrase coined in the marketing
literature that applies to improving the total expected system
profits in a decentralized model and to bringing them closer
to those of a centralized model [33]. Concentrating on the
stochastic demand, single-period setting that is of interest in
this paper, let us give generic formulations of these two types
of models.
More specifically, suppose that the buyer is a newsven-
dor and places an order of size Q to the vendor, and
the vendor reacts by fulfilling the buyer’s order quantity.
Under the centralized approach, Q is specified by solving
maxQ≥0[v(Q)+b(Q)] where v(Q) and b(Q) denote
the vendor’s and buyer’s expected profit functions, respec-
tively. In the rest of the paper, this problem is called the
benchmark centralized model (BCM) whose optimal solution
is denoted by Q∗c and referred as the centralized solution. For
notational ease, we also let πcv = v(Q∗c ), πcb = b(Q∗c ),
and πc = πcb +πcv . Consequently, πcv and πcb denote the ven-
dor’s and buyer’s individual expected profits resulting from
the centralized approach, respectively, whereas πc represents
the optimal value of the total expected system profit under the
centralized approach.
Under the decentralized approach, the buyer acts indepen-
dently of the vendor, and, hence, Q is specified by solving
maxQ≥0 b(Q). In the rest of the paper, this problem is called
the benchmark decentralized model (BDM) whose optimal
solution is denoted by Q∗d and referred as the decentralized
solution. In particular, under the decentralized approach con-
sidered in this paper, the vendor reacts to the buyer’s order
request passively and has no decision right in specifying the
value of Q. Again, for notational ease, we let πdv = v(Q∗d),
πdb = b(Q∗d), and πd = πdb +πdv . Hence, πdv and πdb denote
the vendor’s and buyer’s individual expected profits result-
ing from the decentralized approach, respectively, whereas
πd represents the optimal value of the total expected system
profit under the decentralized approach.
Since BCM maximizes the expected system profits, its
objective function value is an upper bound on the total
expected profits of the buyer–vendor system, i.e., πd ≤ πc.
In this sense, BCM can be used as a point of reference, and
the gap between πd and πc can be considered an inducement
to improve the outcome of the decentralized approach. For
the problem under consideration, the centralized approach
is only used for this theoretical purpose. Here, the underly-
ing idea is that the centralized approach, under which the
profits are shared in a judicious or arbitrary fashion, is not
an agreeable practice by the parties. As a matter of fact, in
the vein of the earlier papers from the channel coordination
literature, cited in Section 3, we rely on this particular idea
(stated in O1 below) as well as the following three additional
observations.
O1. πd ≤ πc: The decentralized approach is inferior to
the centralized approach as far as system profits are
concerned.
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O2. πdb ≥ πcb : The buyer’s expected profits under the
decentralized solution are at least as great as those
under the centralized solution.
O3. πcv ≥ πdv : The vendor’s expected profits under the
centralized solution are at least as great as those under
the decentralized solution.
O4. πcv − πdv ≥ πdb − πcb : The vendor’s gain from the
centralized solution is no less than the buyer’s loss
from the decentralized solution.
We note that these observations are based on the decentral-
ized approach discussed above where the buyer is the dom-
inant party. Consequently, O2 follows because the buyer’s
objective can attain its maximum without consideration of
any external constraints. Note that O1 and O2, together with
the facts that πc = πcb + πcv and πd = πdb + πdv , imply
O3 and O4. It is worth noting that O4 is the key to the idea
of channel coordination, because it suggests that one party’s
gain from the centralized solution is greater than the other
party’s loss. That is, the vendor’s gain from using the central-
ized solution can be used to compensate the buyer’s relative
losses under the centralized solution as well as to increase
the vendor’s profits under the decentralized solution.
As we emphasize in Section 3, the previous literature con-
centrates on those cases where it is advantageous for the
vendor to entice the buyer to increase his/her order quantity
so that channel coordination can be achieved. The following
proposition provides a sufficient condition under which it is,
in fact, desirable for the vendor to induce the buyer to order
more so that channel coordination can be achieved. Later in
the paper, we identify cases where this condition does not
hold, and, hence, it is not necessarily desirable for the vendor
to receive larger orders.
PROPOSITION 1: If the vendor’s expected profit is an
increasing function of the buyer’s order quantity, then the
buyer’s optimal order quantity in the BCM is no less than
his/her optimal order quantity in the BDM.
PROOF: The proof is presented in Appendix A.1. 
Although the above proposition sounds fairly compre-
hensive, there are many practical cases where the vendor’s
expected profits do not increase with the buyer’s order quan-
tity. One such practical situation is when the vendor replenish-
ments incur costs as in Expression (1). For now, we proceed
with a review of the related literature, but later, in Section 5,
we demonstrate cases where Q∗c < Q∗d so that the previously
established coordination mechanisms are not workable.
3. RELATED LITERATURE
As we have already mentioned, despite the growing body
of research on supply-chain coordination, no previous study
in the literature investigates the effects of transportation
considerations on the channel coordination objective. The
existing work that specifically considers transportation issues
focuses rather on the computation of jointly optimal lot-sizing
policies, i.e., centralized solutions [5, 17, 32]. A common
characteristic of these papers is that they concentrate on the
case of deterministic demand, ignore channel coordination
issues, and provide computational solution approaches. This
is mainly because, when transportation considerations are
modeled explicitly, the deterministic centralized problems
alone are computationally challenging, and, hence, research
on the topic is methodologically oriented.
In fact, a significant number of the earlier papers in channel
coordination also consider the deterministic demand case and
propose quantity discounts as a means to modify the behav-
ior of the buyer so that the channel coordination objective
can be achieved. One of the pioneering papers in this stream
of research is by Monahan [26] who studies a single-vendor
single-buyer problem where the vendor’s replenishment lot
size is equal to the buyer’s order quantity per replenishment
cycle. The buyer’s replenishment problem is modeled using
the classical EOQ framework; however, the inventory hold-
ing costs of the buyer are not incorporated into the model.
The author shows that an all-unit discount schedule offered
by the vendor to the buyer can increase the vendor’s profits
while putting the buyer in a “no worse” situation. In a later
study, Banerjee [2] modifies Monahan’s model to incorpo-
rate holding costs and a finite production rate for the vendor.
A further generalization is studied by Lee and Rosenblatt [22]
who assume that the replenishment lot size of the vendor is
an integer multiple of the replenishment lot size of the buyer
and, therefore, incorporate a constraint that limits the max-
imum value of the unit discount. Other notable extensions
of the deterministic demand channel coordination problem
[3,16,18,20,34] consider (i) the case of multiple buyers where
coordinating the channel in compliance with the Robinson
Patman Act is a challenging research problem and (ii) the
case of price-sensitive demand where channel coordination
cannot be guaranteed by quantity discounts alone.
The earlier deterministic demand models we have cited
so far consider quantity discounts and/or fixed payments as
mechanisms for channel coordination. On the other hand,
considering cases involving stochastic demand, recent work
focuses on other alternative mechanisms such as buyback
policies [12,27], return policies [30], and rebate policies [31].
These mechanisms, along with the quantity discounts and/or
fixed payments proposed in the earlier papers that con-
sider deterministic demand, rely on the idea of inducing the
buyer to choose a larger order quantity than his/her optimal
decentralized order quantity. On the other hand, to the best
of our knowledge, no previous work explicitly analyzes the
case of interest in this paper where, in some situations, it may
not be desirable for the vendor to induce the buyer to order
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more. Highlighting such practical cases, our analyses provide
a comparison of the centralized solutions with, and with-
out, transportation considerations for both Models I and II.
This comparison not only helps us to develop efficient solu-
tion approaches for the problem by obtaining bounds on the
optimal replenishment quantities but also leads to insightful
results for answering the four questions of interest listed in
Section 1. These results are discussed throughout Section 5
as they are developed and summarized with our concluding
comments in Section 6.
Finally, we note that all of the papers cited above, as well
as the current paper, take the viewpoint of the vendor and
assume that the vendor has full information about the buyer’s
parameters. In some recent studies, however, different aspects
of channel coordination—such as the impact of asymmetric
information, the value of information sharing, and alternative
contractual settings that take the viewpoint of the buyer—
have been investigated, e.g., see [4, 8, 13, 15, 23]. A similar
investigation for the problem considered in the current paper
remains an area of future research.
4. NOTATION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In the vein of the recent papers from the channel coordi-
nation literature, we consider a stylistic setting consisting of
a vendor and a buyer who operate under the assumptions of
the classical newsvendor problem to satisfy random demand
for a single item with a short product life cycle. The full
order for the cycle is placed before the cycle begins and no
additional orders are accepted by the vendor. In this simple
setting with stochastic demand, depending on the available
supply (replenishment quantity) at the buyer, either one or
the other of the following cases arises. If demand during
the period exceeds the supply, then the buyer is out of stock
and additional demand is lost, incurring a unit lost sale cost
denoted by b. On the other hand, if demand during the period
is less than the available supply at the buyer, then there are
excess items at the buyer that can be sold at a unit sal-
vage value denoted by v. The unit retail price at the buyer
is denoted by r . The vendor simply orders or produces the
buyer’s required replenishment quantity. Since the general
replenishment cost structure of the vendor can also be inter-
preted as a capacitated setup cost due to production at the
vendor’s site in response to the buyer’s order, the results pre-
sented here are potentially applicable to the case where the
vendor is a make-to-order manufacturer, i.e., lot-for-lot man-
ufacturer. Also, the vendor incurs a unit purchase/production
cost denoted by p and charges a unit wholesale price denoted
by c where v < p < c < r . In addition to the fixed replen-
ishment cost denoted by Kv , the vendor incurs a freight cost,
given by Q/PvRv , for a replenishment quantity of Q units,
where Pv is the truck capacity and Rv is the per truck cost.
As we noted earlier, in Model II, we incorporate a similar
generalized replenishment cost structure for the buyer as well
as the vendor. For this purpose, we denote the buyer’s truck
capacity and per truck cost by Pb and Rb, respectively. The
buyer’s fixed cost of replenishment is denoted by Kb in both
Models I and II.
Next, we provide a summary of the notation used so far
and introduce some new notation that will be used throughout
the text.
Q: Number of items ordered by the buyer.
X: Random variable representing the buyer’s
total demand.
f (·): Probability density function of demand.
F(·): Probability distribution function of demand.
p: Vendor’s per unit procurement cost.
c: Per unit wholesale price.
r: Per unit retail price.
v: Per unit salvage value at the buyer.
b: Per unit lost sale cost at the buyer.
Rb: Buyer’s cost per truck.
Rv: Vendor’s cost per truck.
Pb: Truck capacity for buyer’s replenishment.
Pv: Truck capacity for vendor’s replenishment.
̄b(Q): Buyer’s expected profit function excluding
truck costs.
̄v(Q): Vendor’s expected profit function excluding
truck costs.
̄c(Q): Expected system profit function excluding
truck costs, i.e., ̄c(Q) = ̄v(Q)+ ̄b(Q).
b(Q): Buyer’s expected profit function with truck
costs.
v(Q): Vendor’s expected profit function with truck
costs.
Ic(Q): Expected system profit function for Model I,
i.e., Ic(Q) = v(Q) + ̄b(Q).
IIc (Q): Expected system profit function for Model II,
i.e., IIc (Q) = v(Q) + b(Q).
Using the notation defined above, we can write




− (r − v + b)
∫ ∞
Q
(x − Q)f (x)dx. (2)
It can be easily shown that ̄b(Q) is a strictly concave
function with a unique maximizer denoted by Q̄∗d that satisfies
F(Q̄∗d) =
r + b − c
r + b − v . (3)
In fact, Q̄∗d is the optimal value of the buyer’s order quantity
in the decentralized system if the stepwise truck costs for
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the buyer are ignored. When truck costs are excluded, the
vendor’s profits as a function of the buyer’s order quantity,
i.e., ̄v(Q), are given by (c − p)Q − Kv . It follows that




− (r − v + b)
∫ ∞
Q
(x − Q)f (x)dx. (4)
The above function has the same form as ̄b(Q), given by
Expression (2), and, thus, its unique maximizer Q̄∗c satisfies
F(Q̄∗c ) =
r + b − p
r + b − v . (5)
REMARK 1: The buyer’s optimal order quantity in the
centralized model without truck costs is at least as large as the
one in the corresponding decentralized model, i.e., Q̄∗c ≥ Q̄∗d .
The result stated in Remark 1 is a consequence of Proposi-
tion 1. That is, if the vendor does not have truck capacity,
then his/her expected profit, i.e., ̄v(Q), is an increasing
function of the buyer’s order size, and, hence, the channel
is coordinated using an increased order quantity.
Recall that in both Models I and II, the vendor has
the generalized replenishment cost structure represented by
Expression (1). Therefore, in both models, the vendor’s
expected profit function is given by












On the other hand, the buyer’s expected profit functions and,
hence, buyer’s subproblems, in Model I and Model II are
different. Since truck capacity and costs are ignored for the
buyer in Model I, the buyer’s subproblem in this model is to
maximize Expression (2). In Model II, however, the buyer
wishes to maximize b(Q) = ̄b(Q) − Q/PbRb.
Under these assumptions, in both models, the problem is
to decide on the replenishment quantity for the buyer–vendor
system under consideration. Next, we discuss how to compute
this quantity using the decentralized and centralized model-
ing approaches for Models I and II. By knowing the properties
of the expected profit expressions in the buyer’s and vendor’s
decentralized subproblems, it will be easier to solve the cen-
tralized problem where the sum of these two profit functions is
maximized. Hence, we concentrate first on the decentralized
approach.
5. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
We begin by presenting some important properties of the
underlying profit functions that are common to both the
decentralized and the centralized models of the problem. For
this purpose, let us first consider






where g(Q) is a concave, continuous function defined over
all nonnegative real values of Q. Define q as the smallest
maximizer of g(Q). Observe that the second term of h(Q)
is a stepwise function. Denoting the smallest maximizer of
h(Q) by Q∗, we present a method for computing Q∗. The
maximization procedure for h(Q) will be useful for optimiz-
ing the decentralized and centralized objective functions for
Models I and II. For this reason, we present the following
properties of h(Q) that allow us to simplify this procedure.
We note that the proofs of Properties 1–3 and Proposition 2
are presented in Appendix A.2. Also, we define l = q/P 
and let Q1 and Q2 denote two nonnegative numbers.
PROPERTY 1: We have h(Q) < h(q), ∀Q > lP . That
is, the function value at q is greater than the function values
beyond lP .
Property 1 implies that Q∗ ∈ A1 = {Q : 0 ≤ Q ≤ lP }.
PROPERTY 2: Suppose that Q1 < Q2 ≤ q. If (k−1)P <
Q1 < Q2 ≤ kP ≤ q where k is a positive integer; then
h(Q1) < h(Q2). That is, h(Q) is piecewise increasing over
Q ≤ q.
It follows from Property 2 that if (l−1)P < Q1 < Q2 ≤ q
then h(Q1) < h(Q2). Hence, Properties 1 and 2 reduce the
set within which we should look for the maximizers of h(Q)
to integer multiples of P that are less than or equal to q and
to all reals between and including q and lP . That is,
Q∗ ∈ A2 = {Q : Q = kP < q,
k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, and q ≤ Q ≤ lP }.
The next property reduces this set further.
PROPERTY 3: If there exists a nonnegative Q1 such that
Q1 > q and g(Q1) < g(q), then over Q > Q1, we have
g(Q) < g(Q1), and, hence, h(Q) < h(Q1). In other words,
for Q > q, if g(Q) is decreasing (non-increasing) over a
specific region then h(Q) is also decreasing (non-increasing)
over the same region.
Recall that q is defined as the smallest maximizer of g(Q).
Hence, over q ≤ Q ≤ lP , there may be other Q values such
that g(Q) = g(q). However, Property 3 implies that, for
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Figure 1. Different illustrations of h(Q) where Case 1 illustrates the case F 	= ∅, and Case 2 illustrates the case F = ∅.
the purpose of computing Q∗, we can ignore such Q values.
That is,
Q∗ ∈ A3 = {Q : Q = kP < q, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, and q}.
Let us define
F = {k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} : g((k + 1)P − g(kP )) ≤ R,





iP if F 	= ∅,
q if F = ∅ and h(q) > h((l − 1)P ),
(l − 1)P otherwise.
The above proposition indicates that the maximizer of
h(Q) in Expression (7) is either q, which is the maximizer of
the concave component g(Q), or an integer multiple of P that
is less than q (see Fig. 1 for different illustrations of h(Q)
when g(Q) is strictly concave). We use Proposition (2) to
solve the centralized problem for Model I and the decentral-
ized problem for Model II. Next, we present an analysis of the
vendor’s expected profit function. As we have mentioned ear-
lier, when the generalized replenishment cost structure given
by Expression (1) is modeled for the vendor, the coordina-
tion problem is interesting in that there are cases where the
vendor favors a smaller order quantity from the buyer. The
properties of the vendor’s expected profit function are useful
for characterizing these cases.
5.1. Vendor’s Profit Function: v(Q)
Recall Eq. (6), which gives an expression of the vendor’s
profit function v(Q). Figure 2 provides an illustration of
v(Q) based on the following properties of this function.
Property 4 is a direct result of Proposition 2 for the case
Figure 2. An illustration of v(Q) when (c − p)Pv > Rv .
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Figure 3. Different illustrations of v(Q).
g(Q) = (c − p)Q − Kv , i.e., q = ∞, and, hence, its
proof is omitted. Proofs of Properties 5–7 are presented in
Appendix A.3.
PROPERTY 4: v(Q2) > v(Q1), ∀Q1, Q2 s.t . (k − 1)Pv
< Q1 < Q2 ≤ kPv and k ∈ Z+. In other words, v(Q) is
piecewise increasing.
PROPERTY 5: If (c−p)Pv ≤ Rv , then v(Q) < 0, ∀Q ≥
0, i.e., the vendor is at loss for any Q (see Fig. 3). If (c −
p)Pv > Rv , ∃Q ≥ 0 s.t . v(Q) > 0.
The above property is important because it implies that
when the vendor’s revenue from sales of a full truck load of
items (i.e., Pv) does not exceed the per truck cost, the vendor
does not profit from this one-time transaction regardless of
the order quantity. However, by coordinating the channel, the
vendor still has the opportunity to decrease the magnitude of
his/her losses (see Fig. 3). If the revenue from selling Pv units
exceeds the truck cost, the increase in the vendor’s profits
from the coordinated solution may even turn a nonprofitable
transaction into a profitable one for the vendor.
PROPERTY 6: If (c −p)Pv > Rv , then v((k + 1)Pv) >
v(kPv), ∀k. That is, if (c−p)Pv > Rv , the vendor’s profits
at integer multiples of Pv are increasing.
PROPERTY 7: If (c − p)Pv > Rv , then v(kPv) =
v(kPv + Rv/(c − p)) > v(Q), ∀Q s.t . kPv < Q <
kPv + Rv/(c − p), k ∈ Z+.
In the above property, Rv/(c − p) is the least number of
items that should be sold by the vendor to cover the cost of
an additional truck. As seen in Fig. 2, if the buyer’s order
quantity under the market price results in a truck with a load
of less than Rv/(c−p) units for the vendor, i.e., kPv < Q <
kPv +Rv/(c−p), then the vendor can increase his/her profits
either by increasing the order quantity or by decreasing it to
the previous full truck load. The exact value of the order
quantity in the coordinated solution, however, depends also
on the buyer’s expected profit function. This quantity is found
using the centralized model, and it provides the maximum
increase in system profits by balancing the increase in buyer’s
costs with the increase in vendor’s profits.
Next, we derive the decentralized and centralized solutions
for Model I, and we compare the order quantities in the two
solutions to gain insights into coordinating the channel. We
rely on the earlier analysis for maximization of function h(Q)
in Expression (7) for optimizing our models, and we use the
properties of the vendor’s profit function in simplifying our
results.
5.2. Model I
5.2.1. Decentralized Solution for Model I
As described in Section 4, the buyer’s decentralized deci-
sion problem in Model I is to find the value of Q that
maximizes ̄b(Q) given by Expression (2). Let Q∗d ,1 denote
the optimal solution of this problem. Obviously, Q∗d,1 = Q̄∗d .
5.2.2. Centralized Solution for Model I
The objective function to be maximized in the centralized
model is the sum of the expected vendor profits and expected
buyer profits, which in turn is given by
Ic(Q) = v(Q) + ̄b(Q). (8)
Noting that v(Q) = ̄v(Q)−Q/PvRv , this function can
be expressed as






Using the fact that ̄c(Q) = ̄v(Q) + ̄b(Q), the above
expression reduces to
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Recall from Section 4 that ̄c(Q), given by Expression (4),
is the expected system profits of the buyer–vendor system
without truck capacity and costs. This is a strictly concave
function whose maximizer Q̄∗c is given by Expression (5).
Denoting the optimum level of the buyer’s order quantity
in the centralized solution of Model I by Q∗c,1, we have the
following property.
PROPERTY 8: The following are true for the objective






2. If ̄c(Q̄∗c ) < Rv then Ic(Q∗c,1) < 0.
PROOF: The proof is presented in Appendix A.4. 
Note that Ic(Q) consists of a strictly concave function,
i.e., ̄c(Q), and a stepwise term as function h(Q) in Expres-
sion (7). Therefore, the maximizer can be computed using
Proposition (2) by substituting g(Q) = ̄c(Q) and q = Q̄∗c




iPv if F 	= ∅,


















where F = {k ∈ Z+ : −̄c(kPv) + ̄c((k + 1)Pv) ≤
Rv , (k + 1)Pv ≤ Q̄∗c} and i = min{k s.t . k ∈ F}.
REMARK 2: It follows from Expression (11) that Q∗c,1 ≤
Q̄∗c . That is, the centralized order quantity of the system, con-
sidering truck capacity and costs for the vendor, is at most as
large as that of the system without considering truck capacity
and costs. Furthermore, if Q∗c,1 is not equal to Q̄
∗
c , then it can
only take a value that is an integer multiple of Pv .
Remark 2 provides an important insight into the dynamics
of the buyer–vendor system. That is, if the vendor has a gen-
eral replenishment cost structure as in Expression (1), then
either the transportation constraints and costs do not have an
effect on the coordinated buyer–vendor system or, if they do
have an effect, they force the quantity to be a full truck load.
PROPERTY 9: Let F(·) and f (·) denote the distribution
and density functions of the demand, respectively. We have
F((k + 1)Pv)
≥ (r − p + b)Pv − Rv + (r − v + b)
∫ (k+1)Pv
kPv
(x − kPv)f (x)dx
(r − v + b)Pv ,
∀k ∈ Fo, (12)
where Fo = {k : −̄c(kPv) + ̄c((k + 1)Pv) ≤ Rv}.
PROOF: The proof is presented in Appendix A.4. 
Note that Inequality (12) is a more explicit representation
of the constraint −̄c(kPv) + ̄c((k + 1)Pv) ≤ Rv that is
satisfied by k ∈ Fo. If the minimum positive integer k for
which Inequality (12) holds also satisfies (k + 1)Pv ≤ Q̄∗c ,
then the i value in Expression (11) is given by k. Therefore,
for specific distribution and density functions, the represen-
tation given in Inequality (12) may lead to a close form
expression for the value of i in Expression (11). This repre-
sentation also enables a nice interpretation: In Inequality (12),
the expression in the numerator can be considered the sys-
tem’s cost associated with not ordering another full truck load
of demand in addition to k full trucks. This is similar to the
underage cost of each unit demand that cannot be met. Simi-




can be interpreted as the cost associated with ordering an
additional full truck load in excess of k full trucks. Hence,
the denominator of Inequality (12) can be interpreted as the
sum of overage and underage system costs associated with a
truck load in addition to k trucks.
Based on the vendor’s cost parameters and the properties
described in Section 5.1, there are some special cases where
Expression (11) can be simplified further. Theorem 1 and
Propositions 3 and 4 discuss such cases.
THEOREM 1: Suppose (c − p)Pv ≥ Rv .
• If Q∗d,1 	= Q∗d,1/PvPv (i.e., Q∗d,1 is not a full-truck-
load shipment), then Q∗c,1 ≥
(⌈
Q∗d ,1/Pv
⌉ − 1) Pv .




Pv , then Q∗c,1 ≥ Q∗d,1.
That is, Q∗c,1 ≥ Q∗d,1/PvPv .
PROOF: The proof is presented in Appendix A.4. 
The above theorem simplifies the computation of Q∗c,1,
given by Expression (11), in the following way. When
(c − p)Pv ≥ Rv , we do not need to consider certain
values for i. That is, we compute Q∗d,1, and if Q
∗
d ,1 	=Q∗d,1/PvPv , then we construct F by checking the condi-
tions −̄c(kPv)+ ̄c((k +1)Pv) ≤ Rv and (k +1)Pv ≤ Q̄∗c
for k ≥ (Q∗d,1/Pv − 1). Therefore, (Q∗d ,1/Pv − 1)Pv ≤
Q∗c,1 ≤ Q̄∗c . On the other hand, if Q∗d,1 = Q∗d,1/PvPv ,
then we do the same for k ≥ Q∗d ,1/Pv, and, hence,
Q∗d,1 ≤ Q∗c,1 ≤ Q̄∗c .
COROLLARY 1: If (c − p)Pv ≥ Rv , the only possible





⌉ − 1) Pv .
PROOF: The proof follows from Expression (11) and
Theorem 1. 
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PROPOSITION 3: When (c − p)Pv > Rv and Q∗d,1 ≥
(Q∗d ,1/Pv − 1)Pv + Rv/(c − p), then Q∗c,1 ≥ Q∗d,1.
PROOF: See Appendix A.4 for the proof. 
Recall that Rv/(c−p) is the quantity that justifies the cost
of an additional truck for the vendor. Therefore, Proposition 3
suggests that if utilizing the last truck to carryQ∗d,1 units is jus-
tifiable, then Q∗c,1 ≥ Q∗d,1. Otherwise, as stated in Theorem 1,
we have Q∗c,1 ≥ (Q∗d,1/Pv−1)Pv . In this case Q∗c,1 < Q∗d,1
is possible and this occurs only if Q∗c,1 = (Q∗d,1/Pv−1)Pv .
PROPOSITION 4: When (c − p)Pv = Rv:
• If Q∗d,1 	= Q∗d,1/PvPv , then Q∗d,1/PvPv ≥
Q∗c,1 ≥ (Q∗d,1/Pv − 1)Pv .
• If Q∗d,1 = Q∗d,1/PvPv , then Q∗c,1 = Q∗d,1.
PROOF: The proof is presented in Appendix A.4. 
Proposition 4 states that when the revenue from a full truck
load is just enough to cover the per truck cost, depending on
whether Q∗d,1 is a full truck load or less than truck load, the
value of Q∗c,1 is within the “neighborhood” of Q
∗
d,1. That is,
if Q∗d ,1 is not a full truck load, coordination can decrease it
down to or increase it up to the closest full truck load. More
interestingly, if Q∗d,1 is a full truck load, Proposition 4 implies
that there is no need for coordination.
5.2.3. Coordinated Solutions for Model I
In this section, we propose two coordination mechanisms
by which the buyer orders the centralized order quantity while
achieving the expected profits from his/her decentralized
solution. Propositions 6 and 7 describe the structure of the
first coordination mechanism whereas Propositions 8 and 9
describe the structure of the second coordination mechanism.
Proposition 5 is useful in proving why such coordination
mechanisms work. Propositions 7 and 9 identify the cases
where the vendor can increase his/her profits by decreas-
ing the buyer’s order quantity. Hence, these propositions
demonstrate that, unlike the earlier work on channel coor-
dination, when transportation capacity considerations are
modeled explicitly, the resulting cost function no longer
exhibits economies of scale. In our following discussion, with
a slight change of notation, we use ̄b(Q, c) for the expected
buyer profit function. This is because the wholesale price c
will be specified by the vendor in such a way that ordering the
centralized order quantity does not decrease the buyer’s prof-
its relative to his/her decentralized ordering policy. Therefore,
we treat c as a decision variable, and we let Q̄∗d(·) represent
the optimal decentralized order quantity in Model I for a given
value of the wholesale price. In the remainder of the text, as
before, we let Q̄∗d(c) = Q̄∗d .
PROPOSITION 5: ̄b(Q̄∗d(c), c) is a decreasing function
of c for c > v.
PROOF: The proof is easy and is omitted. 
PROPOSITION 6: Let
1 = (r + b − v)[F(Q∗c,1) − F(Q̄∗d)] and c1 = c − 1.
If Q∗c,1 > Q̄
∗
d , under a unit discount of 1 offered by the
vendor to the buyer and a fixed payment of ̄b(Q∗c,1, c1) −
̄b(Q̄
∗
d , c) made by the buyer to the vendor, the buyer stays
in a no worse situation by ordering Q∗c,1 units.
PROOF: See Appendix A.5 for the proof. 
We call the above coordination mechanism the two-part
tariff schedule with fixed cost to the buyer. Figure 4 illustrates
Figure 4. First coordination mechanism when Q∗c,1 > Q̄
∗
d .
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the effects of the discounted price on the buyer’s expected
profits with, and without, the fixed payment. The dashed
curve represents ̄b(Q) under the discounted price. As seen
from Fig. 4, the maximizer of this curve is Q∗c,1. Therefore, the
discount encourages the buyer to order the centralized quan-
tity. However, as formally stated in Proposition 5, the buyer’s
expected profit under the discounted price is more than that
in the decentralized solution under the original price. There-
fore, the profit maximizing vendor, who wants to keep the
buyer in an “indifferent” situation, charges him/her a fixed
payment that results in the dark curve in Fig. 4. Note that this
kind of schedule exhibits a decreasing marginal price.
PROPOSITION 7: Let
2 = (r + b − v)[F(Q̄∗d) − F(Q∗c,1)], c2 = c + 2,
and α1 = inf{x : f (x) > 0}.




c,1 > α1, under a unit price increase of
2 and a fixed payment of ̄b(Q̄∗d , c) − ̄b(Q∗c,1, c2) made
by the vendor to the buyer, the buyer stays in a no worse
situation by ordering Q∗c,1 units.
PROOF: See Appendix A.5 for the proof. 
Since the buyer is rewarded for his/her increased expenses,
we call the coordination mechanism, stated in Proposition 7
and illustrated in Fig. 5, the two-part tariff schedule with
fixed reward to the buyer. Note that this schedule exhibits an
increasing marginal price.
The pricing schedules given in Propositions 6 and 7 coor-
dinate the system in such a way that when the buyer orders
the centralized order quantity, his/her expected profits are no
less than he/she would otherwise earn. Note that both of these
mechanisms require a change in unit price accompanied by
a transfer of fixed payments between the parties. However,
the transfer of fixed payments may be impractical in some
settings. For this reason, next we propose two coordination
mechanisms under which different unit prices are charged






d , c) − ̄b(Q∗c,1, c)
Q∗c,1
and c3 = c − 3.
If Q∗c,1 > Q̄
∗
d , under a unit discount of 3 for order sizes
greater than or equal to Q∗c,1, Q
∗
c,1 maximizes the buyer’s




PROOF: See Appendix A.5 for the proof. 
The above coordination mechanism changes the price only
after Q∗c,1. Therefore, the expected profit of the buyer at Q̄
∗
d
stays the same. This implies that the buyer is indifferent to a
choice between Q∗c,1 and Q̄
∗
d . However, by slightly increas-
ing the price for order sizes less than Q∗c,1, the vendor can
change the behavior of the buyer so that the buyer orders
Q∗c,1 units. The dashed curve in Fig. 6 shows how ̄b(Q)
would appear under the discounted price without any price
breaks. However, as seen in Fig. 6, in this case, the buyer’s
expected profits would be maximized at a quantity between
Q̄∗d and Q
∗
c,1. The price breakpoint that the vendor offers,
however, encourages the buyer not to order this quantity. The
dark continuous line in Fig. 6 shows the buyer’s expected
profits after a slightly increased unit price before Q∗c,1 and a
discount after Q∗c,1. Since the discount is valid on all items for
order sizes greater than or equal to Q∗c,1, we call this pricing
schedule all-unit quantity pricing with economies of scale.
Figure 5. First coordination mechanism when Q∗c,1 < Q̄
∗
d .
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d , c) − ̄b(Q∗c,1, c)
Q∗c,1
and c4 = c − 4.
If Q∗c,1 < Q̄
∗
d , under a unit discount of 4 for order sizes
less than Q∗c,1, Q
∗
c,1 maximizes the buyer’s expected profit
function. Furthermore, ̄b(Q∗c,1, c4) = ̄b(Q̄∗d , c).
PROOF: See Appendix A.5 for the proof. 
With this coordination mechanism, the buyer is again indif-
ferent to a choice between Q∗c,1 and Q̄
∗
d . However, by slightly
increasing the unit price for order sizes greater than Q∗c,1, the
vendor can again influence the behavior of the buyer so that
he/she orders Q∗c,1 units (see Fig. 7). We call this coordination
mechanism all-unit quantity pricing with diseconomies of
scale.
We note that the coordination mechanisms proposed above
can also be used for a system without truck capacities and
costs. Recall that the only difference between such a system
and the one considered in Model I is the consideration of
transportation costs and capacities in the vendor’s replenish-
ment. As implied by Proposition 1 and stated in Remark 1,
without a generalized replenishment cost structure for the
vendor, the optimal order quantity in the centralized solution
is always greater than, or equal to, the optimal order quan-
tity in the decentralized solution. Therefore, to coordinate the
system without truck capacities and costs, we do not need to
consider the case where Q∗c,1 < Q̄
∗
d . Since the buyer’s cost
structure is the same in both systems (i.e., Model I with,
and without, transportation considerations), Proposition 6
Figure 7. Second coordination mechanism when Q∗c,1 < Q̄
∗
d .
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and Proposition 8 can still be used by replacing Q∗c,1
with Q̄∗c .
5.3. Model II
5.3.1. Decentralized Solution for Model II
In the second model, we consider the generalized replen-
ishment cost structure for the buyer as well. The buyer’s sub-
problem is to maximize b(Q) = ̄b(Q)−Q/PbRb over
all Q ≥ 0. As described in Section 4, ̄b(Q) is a strictly con-
cave function of Q with a maximizer at Q̄∗d . Therefore, Propo-
sition (2) can again be used for computing the maximizer of




iPb if F 	= ∅,


















where F = {k ∈ Z+ : −̄b(kPb) + ̄b((k + 1)Pb) ≤
Rb, (k + 1)Pb ≤ Q̄∗d} and i = min{k s.t . k ∈ F}.
5.3.2. Centralized Solution for Model II
In the centralized solution, we maximize IIc (Q) =
v(Q) + b(Q). Note that v(Q) = ̄v(Q) − Q/PvRv
and b(Q) = ̄b(Q) − Q/PbRb. Therefore, IIc (Q) can
be rewritten as











Note also that ̄v(Q) + ̄b(Q) = ̄c(Q). This leads to











Recall that ̄c(Q) is the expected system profits of the cen-
tralized solution when no truck costs or capacity requirements
are included. It is a concave function of Q with a maximizer
at Q̄∗c .
Based on the following properties of IIc (Q), whose
proofs are presented in Appendix A.6, we provide a finite
time exact solution procedure for its maximization.
PROPERTY 10: Let Q2 > Q1 > Q̄∗c . Then IIc (Q2) <
IIc (Q1). That is, 
II
c (Q) is decreasing after Q̄
∗
c .
PROPERTY 11: Let Q1 and Q2 be such that (k1 −1)Pb <
Q1 < Q2 ≤ k1Pb ≤ Q̄∗c and (k2 − 1)Pv < Q1 < Q2 ≤
k2Pv ≤ Q̄∗c where k1 ∈ Z+ and k2 ∈ Z+.Then IIc (Q1) <
IIc (Q2). In other words, for Q ≤ Q̄∗c , IIc (Q) is piecewise
increasing.
Therefore, in maximizing IIc (Q), we must consider Q̄
∗
c
and the integer multiples of Pb and Pv that are less than or
equal to Q̄∗c . Knowing how to obtain the centralized solu-
tion, next we discuss alternative coordination mechanisms
for Model II.
5.3.3. Coordinated Solutions for Model II/
Vendor-Managed Incentive
and Delivery Contracts
In this section, we propose two coordination mechanisms
by which the buyer orders the centralized order quantity
while achieving the expected profits from his/her decentral-
ized solution. Propositions 10 and 11 describe the structure of
the first coordination mechanism, which proposes the vendor
to provide fixed payments/rewards to the buyer only for order
sizes at specified intervals. The vendor can pass these incen-
tives to the buyer by direct payments. Another alternative for
the vendor is to pay some or all of the buyer’s transporta-
tion costs using a VMD agreement as an incentive. Hence,
the second coordination mechanism we propose for Model II
relies on the idea of free deliveries to the buyer where the
vendor pays for truck costs. Propositions 12 and 13 describe
the structure of this mechanism.
PROPOSITION 10: If Q∗c,2 > Q
∗
d,2, the following coor-
dination mechanism maximizes the buyer’s expected profit
function with a maximum function value of b(Q∗d,2)
at Q∗c,2.
• If Q∗c,2 > Q̄
∗
d , the vendor pays the buyer a fixed fee
of b(Q∗d,2) − b(Q∗c,2) for orders larger than or
equal to Q∗c,2.
• If Q∗c,2 < Q̄
∗
d , the vendor pays the buyer a fixed fee
of b(Q∗d,2)−b(Q∗c,2) for order sizes in the range
((Q∗c,2/Pb − 1)Pb, Q∗c,2].
PROOF: See Appendix A.7 for the proof. 
PROPOSITION 11: If Q∗c,2 < Q
∗
d ,2, the following coor-
dination mechanism maximizes the buyer’s expected profit
function with a maximum function value of b(Q∗d,2)
at Q∗c,2.
• If Q∗c,2 = kPb for some positive integer k, then the
vendor pays the buyer a fixed fee of b(Q∗d,2) −
b(Q
∗
c,2) for order sizes less than or equal to Q
∗
c,2.
• If Q∗c,2 = kPv , the vendor pays the buyer a fixed fee
of b(Q∗d,2)−b(Q∗c,2) for order sizes in the range
((Q∗c,2/Pb − 1)Pb, Q∗c,2].
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PROOF: See Appendix A.7 for the proof. 
Under the coordination mechanism described in Proposi-
tions 10 and 11, the vendor pays fixed rewards to the buyer,
and, thus, it is called the vendor-managed incentive contract
with fixed rewards to the buyer. This contract type can be
viewed as a motivation for recent practices, known as vendor-
managed inventory, where the vendor pays some or all of the
transportation related expenses for the buyer. That is, the ven-
dor can pass a reward for the buyer in alternative forms, such
as by covering the buyer’s transportation expenses.
The benefits of vendor-managed inventory have been dis-
cussed widely in the current literature and they extend
beyond cost savings associated with transportation, e.g., see
[6,7,9–11,19,25,28]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
the existing analytical work in the area does not provide a
method for quantifying the potential gains through a care-
fully designed VMD contract under explicit truck costs. For
this reason, next, we analyze a VMD contract for Model II,
where the vendor agrees to pay for truck costs of the buyer.
This alternative coordination mechanism is called the VMD
contract with free shipping for the buyer, and it may result
in extra savings for two reasons: (i) the per truck cost
incurred/negotiated by the vendor may be less than that of the
buyer, and/or (ii) the vendor may own a fleet of vehicles with
larger truck capacity than that of the buyer. As before, our
analysis for this type of contract takes the vendor’s point of
view. We assume that the terms of the contract is specified in a
way that the vendor’s expected profits are increased while the
buyer stays in a no worse situation, i.e., the buyer’s expected
profits stays at b(Q∗d,2). On the other hand, when the vendor
undertakes the transportation responsibility, the buyer may
benefit from potential savings in his/her own fixed costs,
i.e., Kb, due to a reduction in order processing expenses,
etc. Hence, a carefully designed VMD contract may trans-
late into real savings not only for the vendor but also for
the buyer. For this reason, in some problem instances, the
proposed VMD contract with free shipping may be prefer-
able over the incentive contract described by Propositions 10
and 11 above.
Let VMDc (Q) and Q
∗
c,VMD denote the expected system
profit function under the proposed VMD contract and its
maximizer, respectively. Then, we can write











where ̄c(Q) is given by Expression (4), and P VMDb and R
VMD
b
denote the truck capacity and per truck cost associated with
the buyer’s replenishment under the proposed VMD contract.
In other words, the last term of Expression (15) represents the
outbound truck costs paid by the vendor. Obviously, if the
vendor utilizes the same kind of truck for both the inbound
and the outbound transportation, then P VMDb = Pv . However,
for the sake of generality, we do not restrict ourselves to this
case.
Next, we argue that as long as the expected relative sys-
tem gain is positive, i.e., VMDc (Q
∗
c,VMD) − IIc (Q∗c,2) ≥ 0,
there is opportunity for additional savings under the proposed
arrangement, and we present two propositions that specify the
terms of the proposed VMD contract.
PROPOSITION 12: Let 5 = (r + b − v)[F(Q∗c,VMD) −
F(Q̄∗d)] and c5 = c − 5. If Q∗c,VMD ≥ Q̄∗d , under a unit
discount of 5 offered by the vendor to the buyer and a
fixed payment of ̄b(Q∗c,VMD, c5) − b(Q∗d,2, c) made by the
buyer to the vendor, the buyer is expected to earn no less than
b(Q
∗
d,2, c) by ordering Q
∗
c,VMD units.
PROOF: See Appendix A.7 for the proof. 
PROPOSITION 13: Let 6 = (r + b − v)[F(Q̄∗d) −
F(Q∗c,VMD)], c6 = c + 6, and α1 = inf{x : f (x) > 0}.









d,2, c), then under a unit price increase
of 6 and a fixed payment of ̄b(Q∗c,VMD, c6) −
b(Q
∗
d,2, c) made by the buyer to the vendor, the
buyer is expected to earn no less than b(Q∗d ,2, c)
by ordering Q∗c,VMD units.









d,2, c), then under a unit price increase
of 6 and a fixed payment of b(Q∗d ,2, c) −
̄b(Q
∗
c,VMD, c6) made by the vendor to the buyer, the
buyer is expected to earn no less than b(Q∗d ,2, c)
by ordering Q∗c,VMD units.
PROOF: See Appendix A.7 for the proof. 
For the purpose of illustrating the potential gains under
the proposed VMD arrangement, let us consider the case
where p = 13, c = 14, r = 32, v = 11, b = 14, Pb =
200, Rb = 250, Pv = 250, Rv = 300, Kb = 350, Kv = 400,
and the demand is exponentially distributed with parameter
λ = 0.002. It can be easily shown that the decentralized
and centralized order quantities without the VMD contract,
i.e., Q∗d,2 and Q
∗
c,2 values, respectively, are both given by
1000 units. Although this result suggests that the system
is already coordinated, the buyer’s and vendor’s resulting
expected profits are $3531.63 and −$600, respectively, i.e.,
the vendor’s expected loss is $600. Now, suppose that the
vendor incurs $140 per truck if he/she undertakes the buyer’s
truck costs (i.e., RVMDb = 140). Then, Proposition 13 suggests
that under a unit price increase of 1.737 and a fixed payment of
$486.74 from the vendor to the buyer, the buyer’s expected
profits remain at $3531.63 whereas the vendor’s expected
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profits increase to $90. Furthermore, for this specific exam-
ple, the VMD contract does not even require the buyer to
change his/her order quantity, i.e., Q∗c,VMD = 1000. As this
example suggests, under the proposed VMD arrangement,
the vendor can achieve a substantial gain by turning a non-
profitable business into a profitable one whereas the buyer
remains in a no worse situation in terms of the expected
profits. However, when the vendor undertakes the buyer’s
transportation operations, this may lead to a reduction in the
buyer’s fixed cost Kb so that his/her actual expected profit
exceeds the benchmark level of $3531.63. Hence, we say
that the proposed VMD arrangement may lead to a “truly
win–win solution” for both parties. In fact, this is the funda-
mental characteristic that distinguishes the proposed VMD
contract from the other coordination mechanisms discussed
in this paper as well as in the previous literature.
For the example discussed above, Fig. 8 illustrates the
expected relative system gain, as a function of RVMDb . Observe
that both the expected relative gain and its rate are decreas-
ing in RVMDb . Figure 8 demonstrates two threshold points for
RVMDb , each defining a region over which the correspond-
ing Q∗c,VMD values and the rate of expected relative gain
remain constant. It is worthwhile to note that, for the par-
ticular example we consider, the expected relative system
gain is positive not only for RVMDb = 140 < Rb = 250 but
for all RVMDb ≤ 312.5. Obviously, the expected system gain
also depends on the value of P VMDb relative to Pb. Hence, we
conclude this section by analyzing the cases under which the
expected relative system gain proves to be profitable.
PROPOSITION 14:
• Case 1. If P VMDb ≥ Pb, and RVMDb ≤ Rb, then
VMDc (Q
∗
c,VMD) ≥ IIc (Q∗c,2).
• Case 2. If P VMDb ≤ Pb, and RVMDb ≥ Rb, then
VMDc (Q
∗
c,VMD) ≤ IIc (Q∗c,2).
• In other cases, i.e., if
Case 3. P VMDb ≥ Pb, and RVMDb > Rb, or
Case 4. P VMDb ≤ Pb, and RVMDb < Rb,














PROOF: The proof is presented in Appendix A.7. 
6. SUMMARY OF INSIGHTS AND FUTURE
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Channel coordination is particularly important in compet-
itive end-customer markets where the prices are close to the
product’s marginal cost and the market sets the price. There-
fore, reducing other costs, such as logistics-related expenses,
is important for the vendor to increase his/her profits. In
fact, transportation costs represent a significant portion of
the logistics-related expenses, and, consequently, substan-
tial savings can be achieved by the vendor by incorporating
transportation considerations with the channel coordination
objective.
For the problem of interest in this paper, the vendor’s
expected profit is no longer an increasing function of the
buyer’s order quantity. Therefore, the premise that provided
a foundation for the earlier work (i.e., Proposition 1) does
not hold. Consequently, new coordination mechanisms must
be designed to induce the buyer to decrease his/her order
quantity in some cases. To this end, the paper proposes dif-
ferent variants of wholesale pricing and fixed payments as
means to achieve coordinated solutions while answering four
important questions, namely questions Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4
listed in Section 1, as we summarize below.
Figure 8. An illustration of relative gain under the proposed VMD contract.
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In Model I, only the vendor is subject to the generalized
replenishment cost given by Expression (1). Some of the pro-
posed pricing schemes for this model (i.e., “two-part tariff
schedule with fixed cost to the buyer” and “all-unit quan-
tity pricing with economies of scale”) coordinate the supply
chain by increasing the buyer’s order quantity while the others
(i.e., “all-unit quantity pricing with diseconomies of scale”
and “two-part tariff schedule with fixed reward to the buyer”)
coordinate the channel by decreasing the buyer’s order quan-
tity. In Model II, both the vendor and the buyer are subject to
the generalized replenishment cost given by Expression (1).
In this case, the buyer’s expected profit function is no longer
continuous. Due to the complex piecewise structure of the
buyer’s expected profit function, we propose that the vendor
makes fixed payments to the buyer only for order sizes at
specified intervals. The vendor can pass these incentives to
the buyer either by direct payments/incentives or by agree-
ing to pay the buyer’s transportation costs as in the case of
a VMD agreement. Hence, we also analyze a specific VMD
contract where the vendor agrees to send free deliveries by
covering the buyer’s truck costs. We quantify the value of
such a contract and demonstrate that it may provide a sub-
stantial gain for the buyer–vendor system. We argue that the
proposed VMD contract may lead to truly win–win solutions,
and we provide numerical and analytical results justifying the
benefits of VMD practices.
Furthermore, using the coordination mechanisms pro-
posed, we identify additional opportunities for the vendor to
improve his/her profits by potentially turning a nonprofitable
transaction into a profitable one. If the revenue associated
with one full truck load does not exceed the truck cost (i.e.,
(c − p)Pv ≤ Rv), the vendor is at loss. However, he/she can
still decrease the magnitude of these losses through coordi-
nation. If the marginal value of one full truck load of items is
more than the truck cost (i.e., (c−p)Pv > Rv), we show that
the vendor has the opportunity even to profit from a trans-
action that previously resulted in a loss (see Properties 5, 6,
and 7).
In fact, the relative values of (c−p)Pv and Rv also provide
important results for a third party observing the buyer–vendor
system in Model I. Knowing the relationship between (c −
p)Pv and Rv , in addition to the buyer’s decentralized order
quantity, Theorem 1, Proposition 3, and Proposition 4 provide
upper and lower bounds for the order quantity in the coordi-
nated solution. A third party transportation provider can use
these results to influence the coordinated solution by chang-
ing the parameter values under his/her control, i.e., Pv and Rv .
Another important result of our analysis is stated in
Property 8 and Remark 2, which compare the coordinated
solutions of Model I with, and without, consideration of
transportation capacity and costs. This result implies that the
general cost structure may, or may not, have an effect on the
coordinated solution. If it has an effect, then coordination is
achieved at a full truck load. A similar result also holds for
Model II, where in the latter case, the coordinated solution
is achieved either at an integer multiple of the vendor’s truck
size or an integer multiple of the buyer’s truck size. This
result is also useful for a third party transportation provider
because, if a coordination mechanism is in place between
a buyer and a vendor as proposed in this paper, the trans-
portation provider should expect more FTL orders under a
delivery price schedule as in Expression (1). Consequently,
for the sake of truck utilization, it seems reasonable for the
transportation provider to assess freight charges using a deliv-
ery price schedule as in Expression (1), rather than one of the
other well-known freight schedules, such as an all-units or
an incremental delivery-quantity discount schedule.
It is worthwhile to note that the analysis in this paper
takes the vendor’s viewpoint and assumes that the vendor
has prior information about the buyer’s reactions or that the
parameters of the problem are common knowledge. Under
this assumption, the paper demonstrates that there are sig-
nificant cost saving opportunities in systems with explicit
cargo costs and capacity. These opportunities extend beyond
those associated with more traditional systems (e.g., the sys-
tem considered in [26]). Important extensions of the problem
considered here take the viewpoint of the buyer and incor-
porate information asymmetry considerations in the context
of contract design for VMD. Other notable generalizations
include game theoretic models of (i) other contractual settings
such as revenue-sharing contract, (ii) cases of multiple buyers
and/or multiple vendors, and (iii) buyer–vendor–transporter
problems.
APPENDIX A
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
By definition, we have πcb = b(Q∗c ), πcv = v(Q∗c ), πdb = b(Q∗d ),
and πdv = v(Q∗d ). We know that πd ≤ πc , and, therefore, πdb + πdv ≤
πcb + πcv . Since we also have πdb ≥ πcb , we can write πcv − πdv ≥ 0, and,
thus, v(Q∗c ) ≥ v(Q∗d ). When v(Q) is an increasing function of Q, this
result implies that Q∗c ≥ Q∗d . 
A.2. Properties of h(Q) in Expression (7)
PROOF OF PROPERTY 1: By definition, q is the smallest maximizer of
g(Q). Therefore, ∀Q > lP we have g(Q) ≤ g(q). Note that ∀Q > lP , we






R < g(q) − lP ,
so that h(Q) < h(q). 
PROOF OF PROPERTY 2: Since g(Q) is a concave function, ∀Q1,
Q2 s.t . Q1 < Q2 ≤ q, we have g(Q1) < g(Q2). That is, a concave function
is increasing before its smallest maximizer. If (k − 1)P < Q1 < Q2 ≤ kP
then Q1/P  = Q2/P  = k. It follows that g(Q1) − Q1/P R <
g(Q2) − Q2/P R, and, hence, h(Q1) < h(Q2). 
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PROOF OF PROPERTY 3: Since g(Q) is concave, it is decreasing (non-
increasing) after q. That is, g(Q2) ≤ g(Q1), ∀Q1, Q2 s.t. Q2 > Q1 > q.
It follows that Q2/P R ≥ Q1/P R, and hence, g(Q2) −  Q2P R ≤
g(Q1) −  Q1P R. This implies that h(Q2) ≤ h(Q1). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: We present the proof considering the
following different cases.
• Case I: F 	= ∅
Subcase I.I: g((i+1)P )−g(iP ) < R Since g(Q) is a concave
function, it follows that
g((j +1)P )−g(jP ) < R, ∀j ≥ i s.t. (j +1)P ≤ q, (16)
and
g(q) − g((l − 1)P ) < R. (17)
Since h((j + 1)P ) − h(jP ) = g((j + 1)P ) − g(jP ) − R,
Expression (16) implies that h((j + 1)P ) − h(jP ) < 0,
∀j ≥ i s.t. (j + 1)P ≤ q. That is, the value of h(Q) at
integer multiples of P starts to decrease after iP . Therefore,
h(iP ) > h((i + 1)P ), h(iP ) > h((i + 2)P ), . . . , h(iP ) >
h((l − 1)P ). Recall that, i is the smallest integer multiple of
P for which g((i + 1)P ) − g(iP ) ≤ R. This implies that
g((j + 1)P ) − g(jP ) > R, ∀j < i, and hence, h(iP ) >
h(jP ), ∀j < i.
At this point, we have eliminated all integer multiples of
P before q except iP . Observe that, using Expression (17),
h(q) < h((l − 1)P ). Since we already have h(iP ) > h((l −
1)P ), it follows that h(iP ) > h(q). Hence, Q∗ = iP .
Subcase I.II: g((i + 1)P ) − g(iP ) = R
With the same reasoning as in the first subcase, we can elim-
inate all integer multiples of P that are less than iP . For the
remaining feasible points in set A3, let us first consider the
integer multiples of P between iP and q. Let m denote the
largest integer k such that g((k + 1)P ) − g(kP ) = R and
(k + 1)P ≤ q hold. Then, ∀k such that i ≤ k ≤ m, we
have g((k + 1)P ) − g(kP ) = R and h(kP ) = h((k + 1)P ).
This implies that h(iP ) = h((i + 1)P ) = . . . = h(mP) =
h((m + 1)P ). On the other hand, for all j ≥ (m + 1) and
(j + 1)P ≤ q, it follows from the concavity of g(Q) that
g((j + 1)P ) − g(jP ) < R. The rest of the proof is similar to
that of the previous subcase, and it relies on showing that (i)
h((m + 1)P ) > h(jP ), for all integer j such that j > m + 1
and jP ≤ q, and (ii) h(q) < h((m + 1)P ). It follows that
iP , (i + 1)P , . . . , mP , (m+ 1)P are alternative solutions, and
hence, Q∗ = iP .
• Case II: F = ∅
Since F = ∅, then g(kP )−g((k+1)P ) > R, ∀k s.t. (k+1)P ≤
q. Therefore, h((l − 1)P ) < h(jP ), ∀j < (l − 1). This implies
that we can eliminate all integer multiples of P that are less than
(l − 1)P from set A3. Hence, either (l − 1)P or q is optimum. If
h(q) > h((l − 1)P ), then Q∗ = q. Else, if h(q) ≤ h((l − 1)P ),
then Q∗ = (l − 1)P . 
A.3. Properties of v(Q) in Expression (6)
PROOF OF PROPERTY 5: It follows from Property 4 that v(kPv) >
v(Q), ∀Q s.t . (k−1)Pv < Q ≤ kPv where k ∈ Z+. From Expression (6),
we also have v(kPv) = k[(c −p)Pv −Rv]−Kv . If (c −p)Pv ≤ Rv , then
v(kPv) < 0, ∀k ∈ Z+. Since v(kPv) > v(Q), ∀Q s.t . (k − 1)Pv <
Q ≤ kPv and k ∈ Z+, we also have v(Q) < 0, ∀Q ≥ 0.
For the second part of this property, consider Q = kPv where k =
Kv/((c−p)Pv −Rv). Note that k in the above expression is the minimum
number of fully loaded trucks used by the vendor so that he/she can
compensate the fixed cost Kv by the sales of all items purchased in this
replenishment.
Since (c − p)Pv > Rv , we have k ∈ Z+. Therefore,
v(kPv) = Kv/((c − p)Pv − Rv)[(c − p)Pv − Rv] − Kv
≥ (Kv/((c − p)Pv − Rv))[(c − p)Pv − Rv] − Kv = 0.
Furthermore, v(kPv) > 0 unless Kv = k((c − p)Pv − Rv) in which case
the vendor’s profit is just neutral when selling Q = kPv units. However, by
increasing his/her order quantity, say to Q = (k + 1)Pv units, the vendor
can profit (c − p)Pv − Rv dollars. 
PROOF OF PROPERTY 6: From Expression (6), we have
v((k + 1)Pv) − v(kPv) = (c − p)(k + 1)Pv − Kv − (k + 1)Rv
− (c − p)kPv + Kv + kRv = (c − p)Pv − Rv .
Since (c − p)Pv > Rv , it follows that (c − p)Pv − Rv > 0 and, hence,
v((k + 1)Pv) − v(kPv) > 0. 
PROOF OF PROPERTY 7: Since Q < kPv + Rv/(c − p), we have (c −
p)Q < (c−p)kPv +Rv . This, in turn, implies that (c−p)Q−(k+1)Rv <
(c − p)kPv − kRv , and subtracting Kv from both sides of this inequality
leads to
(c − p)Q − Kv − (k + 1)Rv < (c − p)kPv − Kv − kRv .
By assumption, kPv < Q < kPv + Rv/(c − p) and (c − p)Pv > Rv
(i.e., Rv/(c − p) < Pv), so that we also have Q/Pv = k + 1. Therefore,
(c − p)Q − Kv − Q/PvRv < (c − p)kPv − Kv − kRv , which implies
that
v(kPv) > v(Q), ∀Q s.t . kPv < Q < kPv + Rv
c − p .
Note that if Q = kPv + Rv/(c − p), then
v(Q) = (c − p)kPv + Rv − Kv − (k + 1)Rv
= (c − p)kPv − Kv − kRv = v(kPv).

A.4. Centralized Solution for Model I: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPERTY 8:




Ic (Q) = Ic (Q∗c,1) < ̄c(Q∗c,1) ≤ max
Q>0
̄c(Q) = ̄c(Q̄∗c ).
2. Again, using Eq. (10) we can write
max
Q>0



















Since minQ>0Q/PvRv = Rv , the above inequality leads to
Ic (Q
∗
c,1) ≤ ̄c(Q̄∗c ) − Rv . Consequently, if ̄c(Q̄∗c ) < Rv , then
Ic (Q
∗
c,1) < 0. 
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PROOF OF PROPERTY 9: Recalling Expression (4), we can write




(x − kPv)f (x)dx + (r − v + b)Pv[1 − F((k + 1)Pv)].
Also, if k ∈ Fo, then −̄c(kPv) + ̄c((k + 1)Pv) ≤ Rv . Combining these
two expressions and rearranging the terms leads to (12). 
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: Using Expression (9) and the fact that
̄v(Q) = (c − p)Q − Kv , we have
Ic (Q) = ̄b(Q) + (c − p)Q − Kv − Q/PvRv . (18)
Recall that ̄b(Q) is a strictly concave function with a maximizer at
Q̄∗d . Since truck capacity and costs are ignored for the buyer in Model I,
Q∗d ,1 = Q̄∗d . Let j = Q∗d ,1/Pv.
• For the first part of the proof, we will show that ∀m ∈ Z+ and
m < j − 1, Ic (mPv) < Ic ((j − 1)Pv). Let’s consider Ic ((j −
1)P ) − Ic (mP ) = ̄b((j − 1)Pv) − ̄b(mPv) + [(c − p)Pv −
Rv](j −1−m). Since Q∗d ,1 is the maximizer of ̄b(Q) and ̄b(Q)
is a strictly concave function of Q, ̄b((j −1)Pv)−̄b(mPv) > 0.
When (c − p)Pv > Rv , it is also true that [(c − p)Pv − Rv](j −
1 − m) > 0. Therefore, Ic ((j − 1)Pv) − Ic (mPv) > 0. Hence,
Q∗c,1 ≥ (j − 1)Pv .
• For the second part of the proof, we will show that ∀m ∈ Z+ and
m < j , Ic (mPv) < 
I
c (jPv). For this purpose, let’s consider the
difference Ic (jPv) − Ic (mPv) = ̄b(jPv) − ̄b(mPv) + [(c −
p)Pv − Rv](j − m). Using the concavity of ̄b(Q) and the fact
that mPv < jPv = Q∗d ,1, we have that ̄b(jPv) − ̄b(mPv) > 0.
When (c − p)Pv > Rv , [(c − p)Pv − Rv](j − m) > 0. Therefore,
Ic (jPv) − Ic (mPv) > 0 and, hence, if Q∗d ,1 = Q∗d/PvPv , then
Q∗c,1 ≥ Q∗d ,1. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: As stated in Corollary 1, when (c −
p)Pv ≥ Rv , the only possible value of Q∗c,1 that is less than Q∗d ,1 is










, ∀Q s.t . Q∗d ,1/PvPv
≥ Q > (⌈Q∗d ,1/Pv⌉ − 1) Pv + Rv/(c − p).
Therefore, v(Q∗d ,1) ≥ v((Q∗d ,1/Pv − 1)Pv). Since Q∗d ,1 is the
maximizer of ̄b(Q), we also have
̄b(Q
∗










Hence, from Expression (8), we conclude that
Ic (Q
∗












PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
• As illustrated in Fig. 3a, if (c − p)Pv = Rv , then v(kPv) ≥
v(Q), ∀Q and ∀k ∈ Z+. Therefore, v(Q) is maximized at both





















Let’s first consider Q > Q∗d ,1/PvPv . Since ̄b(Q) is a strictly
concave function with a maximizer at Q∗d ,1 and Q∗d ,1 ≤ Q∗d ,1/










































Therefore, Q∗d ,1/PvPv ≥ Q∗c,1 ≥ (Q∗d ,1/Pv − 1)Pv .
• If Q∗d ,1 = Q∗d ,1/PvPv , since both ̄b(Q) and v(Q) are max-
imized at Q = Q∗d ,1, Ic (Q) is also maximized at this value.
Therefore, Q∗c,1 = Q∗d ,1. 
A.5. Coordinated Solutions for Model I: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: By assumption, demand (i.e., X) is a con-
tinuous nonnegative random variable. We define α1 = inf{x : f (x) > 0}
and α2 = sup{x : f (x) > 0}. Therefore, f (x) > 0 where α1 < x < α2.
Under the classical newsvendor assumptions, it is true that α1 < Q̄∗d < α2
and α1 < Q̄∗c < α2. From Remark 2, we know that Q∗c,1 ≤ Q̄∗c . Therefore,
Q̄∗d < Q∗c,1 ≤ Q̄∗c which implies α1 < Q∗c,1 < α2. Hence, F(Q∗c,1) 	= 0 or
F(Q∗c,1) 	= 1.
Since Q∗c,1 ≤ Q̄∗c , we have F(Q∗c,1) ≤ F(Q̄∗c ). Under the new pricing
of the vendor, the unit price is c1 = c − (r + b − v)[F(Q∗c,1) − F(Q̄∗d )].
Substituting (r + b − c)/(r + b − v) for the value of F(Q̄∗d ), we obtain
c1 = r + b − (r + b − v)F (Q∗c,1). Since F(Q∗c,1) ≤ F(Q̄∗c ), we have
c1 > r +b− (r +b−v)F (Q̄∗c ). Recall from Eq. (5) that F(Q̄∗c ) = (r +b−
p)/(r + b − v). Therefore, c1 > p and, hence, c1 > v (if c < v, then the
buyer would buy an infinite amount). Under the unit price c1, using Eq. (3),
it can be shown that Q̄∗d (c1) = Q∗c,1. Therefore, the buyer is motivated to
order Q∗c,1 units.
From Proposition 5, we have that ̄b(Q∗c,1, c1) > ̄b(Q̄∗d , c). If the buyer
is asked to pay a fee of ̄b(Q∗c,1, c1)−̄b(Q̄∗d , c), then his/her total expected
profit is ̄b(Q∗c,1, c1) − ̄b(Q∗c,1, c1) + ̄b(Q̄∗d , c) = ̄b(Q̄∗d , c). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7: Noting that c2 = c+(r+b−v)[F(Q̄∗d )−
F(Q∗c,1)], and using Expression (3), we obtain c2 = r + b − (r + b −
v)F (Q∗c,1). Again using Eq. (3), we conclude that the buyer can be motivated
to orderQ∗c,1 units under this new price schedule if the vendor pays the buyer a
fee of ̄b(Q̄∗d , c)−̄b(Q∗c,1, c2). This is simply because, from Proposition 5,
we have ̄b(Q̄∗d , c) > ̄b(Q∗c,1, c2) so the buyer’s resulting expected total
profit is ̄b(Q̄∗d , c) − ̄b(Q∗c,1, c2) + ̄b(Q∗c,1, c2) = ̄b(Q̄∗d , c). 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8: First, we will show that ̄b(Q∗c,1, c3) =
̄b(Q̄
∗
d , c). Note that, by definition,
c3 = c −
̄b(Q̄
∗
d , c) − ̄b(Q∗c,1, c)
Q∗c,1
, and ̄b(Q, c)
= (−c + v)Q − Kb + (r − v)E[X] − (r − v + b)
∫ ∞
Q
(x − Q)f (x)dx.
















(x − Q∗c,1)f (x)dx,
which in turn results in
̄b(Q
∗
c,1, c3) = ̄b(Q̄∗d , c) − ̄b(Q∗c,1, c) + (−c + v)Q∗c,1 − Kb




(x − Q∗c,1)f (x)dx.
Substituting the expression of ̄b(Q∗c,1, c), the above equation leads to
̄b(Q
∗
c,1, c3) = ̄b(Q̄∗d , c).
In order to prove that Q∗c,1 maximizes the buyer’s expected profit func-
tion, first we show that Q̄∗d < Q̄∗d (c3) < Q∗c,1. Since c3 < c, it follows from
Expression (3) that Q̄∗d < Q̄∗d (c3). Note that ̄b(Q̄∗d , c3) > ̄b(Q̄∗d , c)
because c3 < c and ̄b(Q, c) is decreasing in c for fixed values of Q.
Since ̄b(Q∗c,1, c3) = ̄b(Q̄∗d , c), we also have ̄b(Q̄∗d , c3) > ̄b(Q∗c,1, c3).
Recall that for a fixed value of c, ̄b(Q, c) is a strictly concave function
of Q. Therefore, if Q∗c,1 > Q̄∗d and Q̄∗d < Q̄∗d (c3), then ̄b(Q̄∗d , c3) >
̄b(Q
∗




d (c3) < Q
∗
c,1. It follows that
̄b(Q, c3) < ̄b(Q∗c,1, c3), ∀Q > Q∗c,1. Since Q̄∗d maximizes ̄b(Q, c), we
have ̄b(Q, c) < ̄b(Q̄∗d , c) = ̄b(Q∗c,1, c3), ∀Q < Q∗c,1, and Q 	= Q̄∗d .
Therefore, Q∗c,1 maximizes ̄b(Q, c3) under the new pricing schedule. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9: Similar to the proof of Proposition 8, it
can be easily shown that ̄b(Q∗c,1, c4) = ̄b(Q̄∗d , c). Since c4 < c, it
follows from Expression (3) that Q̄∗d < Q̄∗d (c4). Since Q∗c,1 < Q̄∗d , we
have Q̄∗d (c4) > Q̄∗d > Q∗c,1. Recall that ̄b(Q, c4) is a strictly con-
cave function of Q and Q̄∗d (c4) is its unique maximizer. It follows that
̄b(Q
∗
c,1, c4) > ̄b(Q, c4), ∀Q < Q∗c,1. For Q > Q∗c,1 and Q 	= Q̄∗d , we
have ̄b(Q∗c,1, c4) = ̄b(Q̄∗d , c) > ̄b(Q, c). Therefore, Q∗c,1 maximizes
̄b(Q, c4) under the new pricing schedule. 
A.6. Properties of IIc (Q)
PROOF OF PROPERTY 10: Since ̄c(Q) is a strictly concave function
of Q and Q̄∗c is its maximizer, ̄c(Q) is decreasing ∀Q > Q̄∗c . Observe
that (−Q/PvRv) and (−Q/PbRb) are non-increasing functions. The
sum of a decreasing and a non-increasing function is decreasing. Therefore,
IIc (Q) is decreasing ∀Q > Q̄∗c . 
PROOF OF PROPERTY 11: Since ̄c(Q) is strictly concave with a max-
imizer at Q̄∗c , ̄c(Q1) < ̄c(Q2), ∀Q1, Q2 s.t . Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q̄∗c . When
(k1 − 1)Pb < Q1 < Q2 ≤ k1Pb , we have Q1/Pb = Q2/Pb = k1.
Similarly, when (k2 − 1)Pv < Q1 < Q2 ≤ k2Pv , we have Q1/Pv =
Q2/Pv = k2. Therefore, ̄c(Q1) − Q1/PvRv − Q1/PbRb <
̄c(Q2) − Q2/PvRv − Q2/PbRb so that IIc (Q1) < IIc (Q2). 
A.7. Coordinated Solutions for Model II/
Vendor-Managed Incentive
and Delivery Contracts: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10: Note that in both cases the buyer is com-
pensated with a fixed payment of b(Q∗d ,2)−b(Q∗c,2). Therefore, if he/she
orders Q∗c,2, then he/she stays at a no worse expected profit value, which is
b(Q
∗
d ,2)−b(Q∗c,2)+b(Q∗c,2) = b(Q∗d ,2). Next, we show that in each
case of the proposition the maximum attainable expected profit value for the
buyer is not greater than b(Q∗d ,2).
For the first part (i.e., Q∗c,2 > Q̄∗d ), we use the fact that b(Q) is
decreasing after Q̄∗d . That is, b(Q2) < b(Q1) for all Q1 and Q2 such
that Q̄∗d ≤ Q1 < Q2. Adding a fixed value of b(Q∗d ,2) − b(Q∗c,2) to
both sides of this inequality results in b(Q2) + b(Q∗d ,2) − b(Q∗c,2) <
b(Q1) + b(Q∗d ,2) − b(Q∗c,2), which implies that the buyer’s expected
profit function is still decreasing after Q̄∗d under the new pricing strategy.
Therefore, the maximum value of the buyer’s expected profit in this region
is realized at the smallest value of Q, which is Q∗c,2.
For the second part (i.e., Q∗c,2 < Q̄∗d ), we use Property 2, which implies
that to the left of Q̄∗d , b(Q) is piecewise increasing. Adding a fixed
value to each piece does not change the fact that b(Q) is increasing over
((Q∗c,2/Pb − 1)Pb , Q∗c,2]. Therefore, under the new pricing strategy, Q∗c,2
maximizes the buyer’s expected profit. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 11: From Expression (13), we have Q∗d ,2 ≤
Q̄∗d . We also know from Eqs. (3) and (5) that Q̄∗d ≤ Q̄∗c . Therefore, Q∗d ,2 ≤
Q̄∗d ≤ Q̄∗c , which implies that Q∗c,2 < Q̄∗d and Q∗c,2 < Q̄∗c . As a result, Q∗c,2
can either be an integer multiple of Pb or Pv . In both cases, if the buyer
is compensated with a fixed payment of b(Q∗d ,2) − b(Q∗c,2) and orders
Q∗c,2 units, then he/she again stays at a no worse expected profit level, which
is b(Q∗d ,2) − b(Q∗c,2) + b(Q∗c,2) = b(Q∗d ,2). However, in order to
complete the proof, we need to show that the maximum attainable expected
profit value for the buyer is not greater than b(Q∗d ,2).
From Property 2, we know that for Q < Q̄∗d , b(Q) is piecewise increas-
ing. Since Q∗c,2 < Q∗d ,2, we can also conclude that before Q∗c,2, b(Q) is
increasing at integer multiples of Pb . Otherwise, from Proposition 2, Q∗d ,2
would take a value that is less than Q∗c,2. Thus, for the first part of the propo-
sition, we show that the buyer’s expected profit function in the given region
(i.e., (−∞, Q∗c,2]) reaches its maximum at Q∗c,2. The second part of the proof
follows from the fact that b(Q) is piecewise increasing. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 12: In order to show that the proposed con-
tract is feasible, we prove the following:
• α1 < Q∗c,VMD < α2 where α1 = inf{x : f (x) > 0} and α2 =
sup{x : f (x) > 0}, and
• ̄b(Q∗c,VMD, c5) > b(Q∗d ,2, c).
Observe that function VMDc (Q) in Expression (15) has the same charac-
teristics as function IIc (Q) in Expression (14). Therefore, from Property 10,
we have Q∗c,VMD ≤ Q̄∗c . Also, by definition, we have α1 < Q̄∗d < α2 and
α1 < Q̄
∗
c < α2. Hence, using the fact that Q̄
∗
c ≥ Q∗c,VMD ≥ Q̄∗d , we can
write α1 < Q∗c,VMD < α2 so that 0 < F(Q∗c,VMD) < 1, and this proves the
first item in the above list.
By definition, ̄b(Q, c) > b(Q, c), ∀Q ≥ 0, so that we can write
̄b(Q
∗
d ,2, c) > b(Q
∗
d ,2, c). Furthermore, since Q̄
∗
d is the maximizer of
̄b(Q, c), we have ̄b(Q̄∗d , c) > ̄b(Q∗d ,2, c) > b(Q∗d ,2, c). Recalling
that c5 < c, we also have ̄b(Q, c5) > ̄b(Q, c), ∀Q ≥ 0. As a result,
̄b(Q̄
∗
d , c5) > ̄b(Q̄
∗
d , c) > ̄b(Q
∗
d ,2, c) > b(Q
∗
d ,2, c). (22)
Note that under the new unit price c5 the buyer’s expected profit function
is given by ̄b(Q, c5). Hence, in order to complete the feasibility proof, it
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suffices to show that Q∗c,VMD is the maximizer of ̄b(Q, c5) so that
̄b(Q
∗
c,VMD, c5) > ̄b(Q̄
∗
d , c5). (23)




Recalling Expressions (2) and (3), and utilizing the expression of c5 given
in Proposition 12, it can be easily shown that the maximizer of ̄b(Q, c5) is
given by the Q value where
F(Q) = r + b −
[
c − (r + b − v)F (Q∗c,VMD) + (r + b − v)F (Q̄∗d )
]
r + b − v .
After a little algebra, the right-hand side of the above equation
reduces to F(Q∗c,VMD), and, hence, Q∗c,VMD maximizes ̄b(Q, c5) so that
̄b(Q
∗
c,VMD, c5) > b(Q
∗
d ,2, c), and this completes the feasibility proof.
We continue with showing that under the proposed contract Q∗c,VMD also
maximizes the buyer’s decentralized expected profits, and the buyer is still
expected earn b(Q∗d ,2, c) by ordering Q∗c,VMD units. Note that, under the
proposed contract, the buyer’s expected profit function can be expressed as




c,VMD, c5) − b(Q∗d ,2, c)
]
.
Since the second term of the above function is a fixed value, the maximizer
of VMDb (Q) is the same as the maximizer of ̄b(Q, c5), and it is given by
Q∗c,VMD. Consequently, under the proposed contract, the buyer will order




c,VMD) = b(Q∗d ,2, c). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 13: The proposed contract is feasible be-
cause, by assumption, we have α1 < Q∗c,VMD and Q∗c,VMD < Q̄∗d so that
α1 < Q
∗
c,VMD < α2. In order to complete the proof, we proceed with
showing that, under the proposed contract, Q∗c,VMD maximizes the buyer’s
decentralized expected profit function so that the buyer is still expected to
earn b(Q∗d ,2, c) by ordering Q∗c,VMD units.
Observe that under the new unit price buyer’s expected profits may
be more or less than b(Q∗d ,2, c). However, his/her final expected profits
may be adjusted by fixed payments. The buyer or the vendor may make a
fixed payment to the other party depending on whether ̄b(Q∗c,VMD, c6) >
b(Q
∗
d ,2, c) or ̄b(Q
∗
c,VMD, c6) < b(Q
∗
d ,2, c). In either case, the buyer’s
expected profit function can be represented by




c,VMD, c6) − b(Q∗d ,2, c)
]
. (24)
Note that if ̄b(Q∗c,VMD, c6) > b(Q∗d ,2, c), then ̄b(Q∗c,VMD, c6) −
b(Q
∗
d ,2, c) is positive and the adjustment is aimed at decreasing the buyer’s
expected profits. If ̄b(Q∗c,VMD, c6) < b(Q∗d ,2, c), then ̄b(Q∗c,VMD, c6) −
b(Q
∗
d ,2, c) is negative and the adjustment is aimed at increasing the buyer’s
expected profits.
In order to show that Q∗c,VMD is the maximizer of ̄b(Q, c6), let us recall
Expressions (2) and (3) and utilize the expression of c6 given in Proposi-
tion 13. It can be easily shown that the maximizer of ̄b(Q, c6) is given by
the Q value where
F(Q) = r + b −
[
c + (r + b − v)F (Q̄∗d ) − (r + b − v)F (Q∗c,VMD)
]
r + b − v
= F(Q∗c,VMD).
It follows that, Q∗c,VMD maximizes ̄b(Q, c6). Under the proposed contract,





c,VMD, c6) − b(Q∗d ,2, c)
]
.
Since the second term of the above expression is a fixed value, the maximizer
of VMDb (Q) is the same as the maximizer of ̄b(Q, c6), and it is given by
Q∗c,VMD. Consequently, under the proposed contract, the buyer will order




c,VMD) = b(Q∗d ,2, c), and this completes
the proof. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 14:
• Case 1. Since P VMDb ≥ Pb , we have Q/P VMDb  ≤ Q/Pb, ∀Q ≥ 0.
Also, since RVMDb ≤Rb , we further have Q/P VMDb RVMDb ≤
Q/PbRb , ∀Q ≥ 0. Then, using Expressions (14) and (15), we have





















RVMDb , ∀Q ≥ 0,
and, thus, maxQ≥0 IIc (Q) ≤ maxQ≥0 VMDc (Q).
• Case 2. Since P VMDb ≤ Pb , we have Q/P VMDb  ≥ Q/Pb, ∀Q ≥
0. Also, since RVMDb ≥ Rb , we have Q/P VMDb RVMDb ≥
Q/PbRb , ∀Q ≥ 0. Using Expressions (14) and (15), this in
turn implies that IIc (Q) ≥ VMDc (Q), ∀Q ≥ 0, and, thus,
maxQ≥0 IIc (Q) ≥ maxQ≥0 VMDc (Q).
• Case 3. Suppose that P VMDb ≥ Pb < ∞ and let RVMDb → ∞,
and Rb → 0. Under these assumptions, Q/P VMDb RVMDb >
Q/PbRb , ∀Q ≥ 0, and it follows from Expressions (14) and (15)
that IIc (Q) > 
VMD
c (Q), ∀Q ≥ 0. Hence, maxQ≥0 IIc (Q) >
maxQ≥0 VMDc (Q).
Now, suppose that ∞ > RVMDb > Rb , and let P VMDb → ∞
and Pb → 0. Under these assumptions, Q/P VMDb RVMDb <
Q/PbRb , ∀Q ≥ 0, and, again, Expressions (14) and (15) imply
IIc (Q) < 
VMD
c (Q), ∀Q ≥ 0, so that maxQ≥0 IIc (Q) <
maxQ≥0 VMDc (Q).
• Case 4. The proof for Case 3 can be easily extended for this
case. 
REFERENCES
[1] O. Alp, N. Erkip, and R. Güllü, Optimal lot sizing/vehicle
dispatching policies under stochastic lead times and stepwise
fixed costs, Oper Res 51(1) (2003), 160–171.
[2] A. Banerjee, On a quantity discount pricing model to increase
vendor profits, Manage Sci 32 (1986), 1513–1517.
[3] T. Boyacı and G. Gallego, Cordinating pricing and inventory
replenishment policies for one wholesaler and one or more
geographically dispersed retailers, Int J Prod Econ 77 (2002),
95–111.
[4] G.P. Cachon and M. Fisher, Supply chain inventory manage-
ment and the value of shared information, Manage Sci 46
(2000), 1032–1048.
[5] L.M.A. Chan, A. Muriel, Z.-J. Shen, D. Simchi-Levi, and C.-P.
Teo, Effective zero inventory ordering polices for the single-
warehouse multi-retailer problem with piecewise linear cost
structures, Manage Sci 48 (2002), 1446–1460.
[6] S. Çetinkaya and C.-Y. Lee, Stock replenishment and shipment
scheduling for vendor managed inventory systems, Manage
Sci 46(2) (2000), 217–232.
[7] K.L. Cheung and H.L. Lee, The inventory benefit of shipment
coordination and stock rebalancing in a supply chain, Manage
Sci 48(2) (2002), 300–306.
[8] C.J. Corbett and X. Groote, A supplier’s optimal quantity dis-
count policy under asymmetric information, Manage Sci 46
(2000), 444–450.
Naval Research Logistics DOI 10.1002/nav
Toptal and Çetinkaya: Contractual Agreements 417
[9] S.M. Disney, A.T. Potter, and B.M. Gardner, The impact of
vendor managed inventory on transport operations, Transport
Res E 39 (2003), 363–380.
[10] S.M. Disney and D.R. Towill, The effect of vendor managed
inventory (VMI) dynamics on the bullwhip effect in supply
chains, Int J Prod Econ 85 (2003), 199–215.
[11] Y. Dong and K. Xu, A supply chain model of vendor managed
inventory, Transport Res E 38 (2003), 75–95.
[12] H. Emmons and S.M. Gilbert, The role of returns policies in
pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods, Manage
Sci 44 (1998), 276–283.
[13] Y. Gerchak and Y. Wang, Revenue sharing vs. wholesale-price
contracts in assembly systems with random demand, Prod
Oper Manage 13(1) (2004), 23–33.
[14] S.K. Goyal, An integrated inventory model for a single-
supplier single-customer problem, Int J Prod Res 15 (1976),
107–111.
[15] A. Ha, Supplier–buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost informa-
tion and cutoff level policy for buyer participation, Nav Res
Logist 48 (2001), 41–64.
[16] C. Hofmann, Supplier’s pricing policy in a just-in-time envi-
ronment, Comput Oper Res 27 (2000), 1357–1373.
[17] M.A. Hoque and S.K. Goyal, An optimal policy for single-
vendor single-buyer integrated production-inventory system
with capacity constraint of transport equipment, Int J Prod
Econ 65 (2000), 305–315.
[18] A.P. Jeuland and S.M. Shugan, Managing channel profits,
Market Sci 2 (1983), 239–272.
[19] R. Kaipia, J. Holmström, and K. Tanskanen, VMI: What are
you loosing if you let your customer place orders? Prod Plan
Contr 13(1) (2002), 17–25.
[20] R. Lal and R. Staelin, An approch for developing an optimal
discount pricing policy, Manage Sci 30 (1984), 1524–1539.
[21] C.-Y. Lee, A solution to the multiple setup problem with
dynamic demand, IIE Trans 21(3) (1989), 266–270.
[22] H.L. Lee and M.J. Rosenblatt, A generalized quantity discount
pricing model to increase supplier’s profits, Manage Sci 32
(1986), 1177–1185.
[23] H.L. Lee, K. So, and C.S. Tang, The value of information
sharing in a two-level supply chain, Manage Sci 46 (2000),
626–643.
[24] S.A. Lippman, Optimal inventory policy with multiple setup
costs, Manage Sci 16 (1969), 118–138.
[25] B.K. Mishra and S. Raghunathan, Retailer- vs. vendor-
managed inventory and brand competition, Manage Sci 50(4)
(2004), 445–457.
[26] J.P. Monahan, A quantity discount pricing model to increase
vendor profits, Manage Sci 30 (1984), 720–726.
[27] B.A. Pasternack, Optimal pricing and returns policies for
perishable commodities, Market Sci 4 (1985), 166–176.
[28] R. Piplani and S. Viswanathan, A model for evaluating
supplier-owned inventory strategy, Int J Prod Econ 81–82
(2003), 565–571.
[29] L.B. Schwarz, A simple continuous review deterministic one-
warehouse N -retailer inventory problem, Manage Sci 19
(1973), 555–566.
[30] T.A. Taylor, Channel coordination under price protection,
midlife returns, and end-of-life returns in dynamic markets,
Manage Sci 47 (2001), 1220–1234.
[31] T.A. Taylor, Supply chain coordination under channel
rebates with sales effort effects, Manage Sci 48 (2002),
992–1007.
[32] A. Toptal, S. Çetinkaya, and C.-Y. Lee, The buyer–vendor
coordination problem: Modeling inbound and outbound cargo
capacity and costs, IIE Trans Logist Schedul 35 (2003),
987–1002.
[33] A. Tsay, S. Nahmias, and N. Agrawal, Modeling supply chain
contracts: A review. In S. Tayur, R. Ganeshan, M. Magazine,
editors. Quantitative Models for Supply Chain Management,
Kluwer Academic, Norwell, MA, 2000, p. 299–330.
[34] Z.K. Weng, Channel coordination and quantity discounts,
Manage Sci 41 (1995), 1509–1522.
[35] C.A. Yano and A.M. Newman, Scheduling trains and con-
tainers with due dates and dynamic arrivals, Transport Sci 34
(2000), 256–270.
Naval Research Logistics DOI 10.1002/nav
